| Title |
Moral Hazard for the Available Capacity in Electricity Capacity Markets |
| Authors |
김진호(Kim, Jin-Ho) ; 박종배(Park, Jong-Bae) |
| Keywords |
Electricity capacity markets |
| Abstract |
In this paper, we investigate how an electricity capacity market design may encourage generators to exaggerate their available capacity. In order for an analytical approach, a two player game model is introduced. We focus on two pure strategy Nash equilibria: an equilibrium at which generators offer their true capacities, and an equilibrium at which generators offer exaggerated capacities. The latter case is caused by asymmetries of information between players and so called 'moral hazard' in terms of the economics literature. This paper shows that, considering practical electricity markets, the moral hazard case is highly probable. Moreover, it is shown that, with the considered capacity market design in the real world, the better the electricity energy market performs, the higher the risk of moral hazard becomes. |